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Abstract
We investigate the problems of identity and closeness testing over a discrete
population from random samples. Our goal is to develop efficient testers while
guaranteeing Differential Privacy to the individuals of the population. We describe
an approach that yields sample-efficient differentially private testers for these
problems. Our theoretical results show that there exist private identity and closeness
testers that are nearly as sample-efficient as their non-private counterparts. We
perform an experimental evaluation of our algorithms on synthetic data. Our
experiments illustrate that our private testers achieve small type I and type II errors
with sample size sublinear in the domain size of the underlying distributions.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of finding sample-efficient algorithms that allow us to understand properties
of distributions over very large discrete domains. Such statistical tests have been traditionally studied
in statistics because of their importance in virtually every scientific endeavor that involves data.
Recent work in the theoretical computer science community has investigated the case when the
discrete domains are large and no a priori assumptions can be made about the distribution (for
example, when it cannot be assumed that the distribution is normal, Gaussian, or even smooth).
Optimal methods with sublinear sample complexity have been given for testing such properties as
whether a distribution is uniform, identical to a known distribution (aka testing “goodness-of-fit”),
closeness of two unknown distributions, and independence.
While statistical tests are very important for advancing science, when they are performed on sensitive
data representing specific individuals, such as data describing medical or other behavioral phenomena,
it may be that the outcomes of the tests reveal information that should not be divulged. Techniques
from differential privacy give us hope that one may obtain the scientific benefit of statistical tests
without compromising the privacy of the individuals in the study. Specifically, differential privacy
requires that similar datasets have statistically close outputs – once this property is achieved, then
provable privacy guarantees can be made. Differential privacy is a rich and active area of study, in
which techniques have been developed and applied to give private algorithms for a range of data
analysis tasks.
Our Contributions In this paper, we study the problem of hypothesis testing in the presence of
privacy constraints, focusing on the notion of differential privacy [17]. Our emphasis is on the
sublinear regime, i.e., when the number of samples available is sublinear in the domain size of the
underlying distribution(s). We leverage recent progress in distribution property testing to obtain
sample-efficient private algorithms for the problems of testing the identity and closeness of discrete
distributions. The main conceptual message of our results is that we can achieve differential privacy
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with only a small increase in the sample complexity compared to the non-private case. We provide
sample-efficient testers for identity to a fixed distribution (goodness-of-fit) and equivalence/closeness
between two unknown distributions (both given by samples). For the latter problem, we are the first
to give such sample-efficient testers with provable privacy guarantees. Our experimental evaluation
on synthetic data illustrates that our testers achieve small type I and type II errors with a sublinear
number of samples when the domain size is large.
Technical Overview We now provide a brief overview of our approach. We start by observing
that there is a simple generic method to convert a non-private tester into a private tester with a
multiplicative overhead in the sample complexity. This method is well-known in differential privacy,
but for the sake of completeness we describe it in Section B. It is useful to contrast the sample
complexity of the generic method with the (substantially smaller) sample complexity of our testers in
Sections 3, 4, and 5. For convenience, throughout this paper, we work with testing algorithms that
have failure probability at most 1/3. As we point out in Section C, this is without loss of generality:
a standard amplification method shows that we can always achieve error probability δ at the expense
of a log(1/δ) multiplicative factor in the sample complexity, even in the differentially private setting.
Our results for identity testing follow a modular approach: First, we use a recently discovered
black-box reduction of identity testing to uniformity testing proposed by Goldreich in [19], building
on the result of Diakonikolas and Kane [13]. We point out (Section 3) that this reduction also applies
in the private setting. As a corollary, we can translate any private uniformity tester to a private identity
tester without increasing the sample size by more than a small constant factor. It remains to develop
sample-efficient private uniformity testers. We develop two such private methods (Section 4): Our
first method is a private version of Paninski’s uniformity tester [24], which relies on the number of
domain elements that appear in the sample exactly once. This statistic has low sensitivity, allowing
an easy translation to the private setting. The sample complexity of our aforementioned uniformity
tester is
O(
√
n/2 +
√
n/(
√
ξ)) ,
where  is the accuracy of the tester and ξ is the privacy parameter. As our experimental results
illustrate, this private tester performs very well in the sublinear regime.
On the other hand, it is well-known that Paninski’s uniformity tester only works when the sample
size is smaller than the domain size (even in the non-private setting). To obtain a uniformity tester
that works for the entire setting of parameters, we develop our second method: a private version of
the collisions-based tester first proposed by Goldreich and Ron [20]. The collisions-based tester was
recently shown to be sample-optimal in the non-private setting [11]. The main difficulty in turning
this into a private tester is that the underlying statistic (number of collisions) has very high worst-case
sensitivity. To overcome this issue, we add a simple pre-processing step to our tester that rejects
when there is a single element that appears many times in the sample. (We note that a similar idea
was independently used in [5], though the details are somewhat different.) This allows us to reduce
the effective sensitivity of our statistic and yields a sample-efficient private tester. Specifically, the
sample complexity of our collision-based private tester is
O˜
(√
n/2 +
√
n/(ξ) + 1/(2ξ)
)
.
For the problem of closeness testing, we build on the chi-square type optimal tester provided by Chan
et al. [9]. A major advantage of this statistic is that it has constant sensitivity. Hence, developing
a sample-efficient private version can be achieved by adding Laplace noise. A careful analysis
shows that this noisy statistic is still accurate without substantially increasing the sample complexity.
Specifically, the sample complexity of our private closeness tester is
O
(
max
{√
n/2, n2/3/4/3,
√
n/(
√
ξ), 1/(ξ2)
})
.
Related Work During the past two decades, distribution property testing [3] – whose roots lie in
statistical hypothesis testing [23, 22] – has received considerable attention by the computer science
community, see [25, 7] for two recent surveys. The majority of the early work in this field has
focused on characterizing the sample size needed to test properties of arbitrary distributions of a
given support size. After two decades of study, this “worst-case” regime is well-understood: for many
properties of interest there exist sample-optimal testers (matched by information-theoretic lower
bounds) [24, 10, 9, 26, 15, 14, 2, 13, 6, 11, 8, 16].
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A recent line of work [27, 18, 21, 5] has studied distribution testing with privacy constraints. The
majority of these works [27, 18, 21] focus on type I error analysis subject to privacy guarantees.
Most relevant to ours is the very recent work by Cai et al. [5] that provides an identity tester with
provable sample guarantees and bounded type I and type II errors. Their sample upper bounds for
identity testing are comparable to ours (though quantitatively worse in some parameter settings). We
also note that Cai et al. [5] do not consider the more general problem of closeness testing. Finally,
recent work of Diakonikolas et al. [12] has provided differentially private algorithms for learning
various families of discrete distributions. For the case of unstructured discrete distributions, such
algorithms inherently require sample size at least linear in the domain size, even for constant values
of the approximation parameter.
2 Preliminaries
Notation and Basic Definitions. We use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We say p is a discrete
distribution over [n] if p : [n] → [0, 1] is a function such that ∑ni=1 p(i) = 1, where p(i) denotes
the probability of element i according to distribution p. For a set S ⊂ [n], p(S) denotes the total
probability of the elements in S (i.e., p(S) =
∑
i∈S p(i)). For any integer k > 0, the `
k-norm of p is
equal to
(∑n
i=1 |p(i)|k
) 1
k , and it is denoted by ‖p‖k. The `k-distance between two distributions p
and q over [n] is equal to
(∑n
i=1 |p(i)− q(i)|k
) 1
k . We use Lap(b) to denote a random variable that
is drawn from a Laplace distribution with parameter b and mean zero.
The problem of identity testing (or goodness-of-fit) is the following: Given sample access to an
unknown distribution p over [n] and an explicit distribution q over [n], we want to distinguish, with
probability at least 2/3, between the cases that p = q (completeness) and ‖p− q‖1 ≥  (soundness).
The special case of this problem when q = Un, the uniform distribution over [n], is called uniformity
testing. The generalization of identity testing when both p and q are unknown and only accessible via
samples is called closeness testing.
Differential Privacy. In our context, a dataset is a multiset of samples drawn from a distribution
over [n]. We say that X and Y are neighboring datasets if they differ in exactly one element.
Definition 2.1. A randomized algorithm A : [n]s → R, is ξ-differentially private if for any S ⊆ R
and any neighboring datasets X,Y , we have that Pr[A(X) ∈ S] ≤ eξ ·Pr[A(Y ) ∈ S] .
We will say that a tester is (, ξ)-private, to mean that  is the accuracy parameter, ξ is the privacy
parameter, and the tester outputs the right answer with probability at least 2/3. For conciseness,
we use the term ξ-private instead of ξ-differentially private. We provide more details about general
techniques in differential privacy in Appendix A.
3 Private Identity Testing: Reduction to Private Uniformity Testing
In this section, we provide a simple black-box reduction of private identity testing (against an arbitrary
fixed distribution) to its special case of private uniformity testing. Specifically, we point out that
a recent reduction of (non-private) identity testing to (non-private) uniformity testing works in the
private setting as well.
In recent work [19], Goldreich provides a reduction from identity testing to uniformity testing with
only a constant multiplicative overhead in the query complexity. Here, we show that the same
reduction works in the private setting.
Suppose we want to test identity between an unknown distribution p over [n] and an explicit distribu-
tion q. The reduction of [19] transforms the distribution p into a new distribution p′, over a domain of
size O(n), such that if p = q then p′ is the uniform distribution, and if p is far from q, p′ is also far
from uniform. Specifically, the reduction defines a randomized mapping of a sample i ∈ [n] from p
to a sample (j, a) from p′ that depends only on the explicit distribution q. This property is crucial as
it allows us to show that the transformation preserves differential privacy, as the following theorem
states.
Theorem 3.1. Given an (, ξ)-private uniformity tester using s(n, , ξ) samples, there exists an
(, ξ)-private tester for identity using s = s(6n, /3, ξ) samples.
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In the proof, we give a reduction from identity testing to uniformity testing. The mapping itself
depends only on q. This fact implies that it suffices to use any private tester for uniformity. The
detailed proof of the theorem is in Appendix D.
4 Private Uniformity Testing
In this section, we provide two sample-efficient private uniformity testers. Our testers are private
versions of two well-studied (non-private) testers, due to Goldreich and Ron [20] and Paninski [24].
Paninski’s uniformity tester [24] relies on the number of unique elements in the sample, while [20]
relies on the number of collisions. Both testers are known to be sample-optimal in the non-private
setting [24, 11].
We give private versions of both of these algorithms. The sample complexity of our private Panin-
ski uniformity tester is O(
√
n/2 +
√
n/(
√
ξ)) . Therefore, as long as ξ = Ω(2), the privacy
requirement increases the sample complexity by at most a constant factor.
Unfortunately, the aforementioned tester only succeeds when its sample size is smaller than the
domain size n. To be able to handle the entire range of parameters, we develop a private version of the
collisions-based tester from [20]. Our private version of the collisions tester has sample complexity
O˜
(√
n/2 +
√
n/(ξ) + 1/(2ξ)
)
. Similarly, the effect of the privacy is mild as long as ξ = Ω().
4.1 Private Uniformity Tester based on Unique Elements
Here, we provide a private tester for uniformity based on the number of unique elements. The
number of unique elements is (negatively) related to the number of collisions and the `2-norm of
the distribution. Therefore, the greater the number of unique elements is, the more the distribution
appears uniform. To make the algorithm private, we use the Laplace mechanism which adds a small
amount of noise to the number of unique elements. Then, we compare the number of unique elements
with a threshold to decide if the distribution is uniform or far from uniform. The noise is big enough
to make the algorithm private, but it does not detract much from the accuracy of the tester. We prove
this formally in Theorem 4.1.
Algorithm 1 The Private Algorithm for the uniformity test
1: procedure PRIVATE-UNIFORMITY-TEST(, ξ)
2: s← 5√n/(√ξ) + 6√n/2
3: C ← s2√
n
4: x1, x2, . . . , xs ← s samples drawn from p
5: K ← the number of unique elements in {x1, x2, . . . , xs}
6: K ′ ← K + Lap(2/ξ)
7: if K ′ < EU [K]− C2/(22) then
8: Output reject.
9: Output accept.
Theorem 4.1. Given s = O(
√
n/(
√
ξ) +
√
n/2) samples from distribution p over [n], Algorithm
1 is an (, ξ)-private tester for uniformity if s is sufficiently smaller than n.
By the properties of the Laplace mechanism, we know that K is private. Then, we show that adding
noise to K does not harm the accuracy of the tester because the variance of the noise is small.
Using the Chebyshev inequality, we show that, with high probability, Z concentrates well around its
expected value given the size of the sample set. Thus, since there is a large enough gap between the
expected values of K which case the samples came from. The proof of the theorem is in Appendix E.
4.2 Private Uniformity Tester via Collisions
In this subsection, we describe the private version of our collisions-based uniformity tester. The main
difficulty in turning this into a private tester is that the underlying statistic (number of collisions) has
very high worst-case sensitivity. Specifically, if the sample set contains s copies of a given domain
element, by changing just one of the copies to another element, the number of collisions drops by
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an additive s. So, if we add enough noise to the statistic to cover the sensitivity of s, it substantially
degrades the tester accuracy.
To overcome this issue, we add a simple pre-processing step to our tester. We notice that the sensitivity
of the number of collisions, f(X), for sample set X , depends on the maximum frequency of the
element in the sample set. Let ni(X) denote the number of occurrences of element i in the sample
set X , and let nmax(X) denote the maximum ni(X). We note that for two neighboring sample sets
X and Y , the difference of the number of collisions, |f(X)− f(Y )|, is at most nmax(X). Therefore,
the sensitivity of f is high on X’s with large nmax(X). However, if the underlying distribution is
uniform, we do not expect any particular element to show up very frequently. Hence, if nmax(X) is
high, the algorithm can output reject regardless of f(X). So, the final output of the algorithm does
not change drastically on X and Y , while the number of collisions varies a lot.
This simple observation forms the basis for our modified algorithm. The algorithm uses two statistics:
nmax and f . If nmax is too large, it outputs reject. Otherwise, f(X) determines the output. In the
second case, since nmax is not too large, f has bounded sensitivity. Therefore, we can make it private
by adding a small amount of noise to it. The detailed procedure is explained in Algorithm 2. We
show correctness in Theorem 4.2.
Algorithm 2 Private uniformity tester based on the number of collisions
1: procedure PRIVATE-UNIFORMITY-TEST(, ξ)
2: s← Θ
(√
n
2 +
√
n logn
 ξ1/2
+
√
nmax(1,log 1/ξ)
 ξ +
1
2 ξ
)
.
3: Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xs} be a multiset of s samples drawn from p
4: ni(X)← |{j|xj ∈ x and xj = i}|
5: nmax(X)← max
i
ni(X)
6: nˆmax(X)← nmax(X) + Lap(2/ξ)
7: f(X)← collisions(X)
8: ηf ← max
(
3s
2n , 12 e
2 ln 24n
)
+ (2 ln 12)/ξ + 2 max(ln 3, ln 3/ξ)/ξ
9: T ← max ( 3s2n , 12 e2 ln 24n)+ (2 ln 12)/ξ
10: fˆ(X)← f(X) + Lap(2 ηf/ξ)
11: if nˆmax(X) < T & fˆ(X) < 6+
2
6n
(
s
2
)
then
12: O ← accept.
13: else
14: O ← reject.
15: With probability 1/6, O ← {accept, reject} \O. 〈〈flip the answer with probability 1/6.〉〉
16: Output O.
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm 2 is an (, ξ)-private tester for uniformity.
To preserve the accuracy of the tester, we add a tiny amount of noise to f , which is not sufficient to
make fˆ fully private. However, we observe that the sensitivity of f is high when nmax is high. So,
the algorithm is likely to output reject because of high nmax and regardless of f . We show that effect
of f on the output is small enough that the algorithm remains private. The proof of the theorem is in
Appendix F.
5 Private Closeness Testing
In this section, we give a private algorithm for testing closeness of two unknown discrete distributions.
Our tester relies on the chi-squared type sample-optimal (non-private) closeness tester proposed in [1]
and analyzed in [9]. The closeness tester relies on the following statistic:
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Z :=
∑
i
(Xi − Yi)2 −Xi − Yi
Xi + Yi
,
where Xi is the number of occurrences of element i in the sample set from p, and Yi is the number
of occurrences of element i in the sample set from q. The statistic Z is chosen in a way so that
its expected values in the completeness and soundness cases differ substantially. The challenging
part of the analysis involves a tight upper bound on the variance, which allows to show that Z is
well-concentrated after an appropriate number of samples. More precisely, the following statements
were shown in [9]:
E[Z] =
∑
i
(p(i)− q(i))2
p(i) + q(i)
m
(
1− 1− e
m(p(i)+q(i))
m(p(i) + q(i))
)
≥ m
2
4n+ 2m
‖p− q‖21 . (1)
and
Var[Z] ≤ 2 min{m,n}+
∑
i
5m
(p(i)− q(i))2
p(i) + q(i)
. (2)
The private version of the above statistic is simple: We add noise to the random variable Z and work
with the noisy statistic, denoted by Z ′. We need to show that we still can infer the correct answer
from Z ′, and the noise does not incapacitate our tester. The main reason that this is indeed possible is
because the statistic Z has bounded sensitivity.
Algorithm 3 is our private closeness tester and we prove its correctness in Theorem 5.1.
Algorithm 3 The private tester for closeness of two unknown distributions
1: procedure PRIVATE-CLOSENESS-TEST(, ξ)
2: m← C ·max
(√
n
2
,
n2/3
4/3
,
√
n√
ξ
,
1
ξ2
)
3: Draw m samples from distributions p and q.
4: Xi ← the number of occurrences of the i-th element in the samples from p
5: Yi ← the number of occurrences of the i-th element in the samples from q
6: Z ←∑
i
(Xi − Yi)2 −Xi − Yi
Xi + Yi
〈〈for Xi + Yi 6= 0.〉〉
7: η ← Lap(8/ξ)
8: Z ′ = Z + η
9: T ← m
22
8n+ 4m
10: if Z ′ ≤ T then
11: Accept
12: else
13: Reject
Theorem 5.1. Given sample access to two distributions p and q, Algorithm 3 is an (, ξ)-private
tester for closeness of p and q.
Since the sensitivity of Z is small, we can add a small amount of noise to it to make it private, using
the Laplace mechanism. Then, we show that adding the noise to Z does not increase its variance
drastically. Finally, we prove by the Chebyshev inequality that, with high probability, Z concentrates
well around its expected value given the size of the sample set. Thus, since we have shown a large
enough gap between the expected values of Z the in accept and reject cases, we can distinguish
between a pair of identical distributions and a pair of distributions that are -far from each other. The
proof of the theorem is in Appendix G.
6 Experiments
We provide an empirical evaluation of the proposed algorithms on synthetic data. All experiments
were performed on a computer with a 1.6 GHz Intel(R) Core(TM ) i5-4200U CPU and 3 GB of RAM.
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The focus of the experiments is to find the minimum number of samples such that the type I and
type II errors are small. In our synthetic trials, we show that for sufficiently large domain size n, our
algorithms is likely to succeed with a sublinear number of samples.
Specifically, given a domain size n, we find the (approximately) minimum number of samples
such that the type I and type II errors are less than 1/3. First, we pick a distribution (or a pair of
distributions) that should be accepted with probability 2/3, and another distribution that should be
rejected with probability 2/3. Then, we start with an initial number of samples s. For each case, we
run the algorithm r times on a sample set of size s. Then we estimate the accuracy of the algorithm
for these sample sets. If the empirical accuracy is less than 2/3 for either of the distributions, we
increase s appropriately and repeat the process until we find s that results in an accuracy of at least
2/3.
Private Uniformity Testing. We implemented Algorithm 1 to test the uniformity of a distribution
in `1-distance. Let p be a distribution that has probability (1 + )/n on half of the domain and
probability (1 − )/n on the other half. Clearly, p is -far from uniform. Since p can be used to
generate a tight sample lower bound [24], p is in some sense the hardest instance to distinguish from
the uniform distribution. We run the algorithm using samples from the uniform distribution and
from p with the following parameters:  = 0.3, r = 300, and ξ = 0.2. We determine the number
of samples required for this tester to have accuracy at least 2/3 for domain sizes n ranging from 1
million to 2 million (increasing n by 10000 at each step). The experimental results are shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: The sample complexity of Algorithm 1 for private uniformity testing.
Private Identity Testing. Testing uniformity is a special case of testing identity of distributions, and
it is known to be essentially the hardest instance of the more general problem. Similarly to [5], we
consider testing identity to a distribution q, where q is uniform on two disjoint subsets of the domain,
of sizes n1 = n/1000 and n2 = 999n/1000. The total probability mass of the first subset is 0.6
and the mass of the second one is 0.4. The distribution q can be viewed as a distribution which is
“heavy” on a small number of elements and “light” on the rest of the elements. To build a distribution
p which is -far from q, we tweak the probability of the elements in the second subset by ±/n2. As
explained in Section 3, to implement the identity test, we map our sample set S to another sample set
S′ on a slightly larger domain. Then, we use Algorithm 1 to test the uniformity on the new domain
using samples in S′. We set  = 0.3, r = 200, and ξ = 0.2. We find the required number of samples
of this tester in order to have accuracy at least 2/3, for n from 1 million to 2 million (increasing n by
10000 at each step). The result is shown in Figure 2.
Private Closeness Testing. We implemented Algorithm 3 to test closeness of two unknown distribu-
tions. Let p be a distribution such that n2/3 of the domain elements have probability (1− /2)/n2/3
(the “heavy elements”) and n/4 “light” elements have probability 2/n. Let q be a distribution that
has probability (1− /2)/n2/3 on the same set of heavy elements as p, and for a disjoint set of n/4
light elements assigns probability 2/n. Since the light elements are disjoint, it is clear that p is -far
from q. It has been shown in [4] and [9], that this pair of distributions yields a family of pairs of
distributions (via randomly permuting the names of the elements) which can be used to give a tight
lower bound on the sample complexity for the problem of testing closeness.
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Figure 2: The sample complexity of private identity testing.
To evaluate the accuracy of our algorithm, we use the tester to distinguish the following pairs: (q, q)
and (p, q). We set  = 0.3, r = 200, and ξ = 0.2. We find the required number of samples of this
tester in order to have accuracy at least 2/3, for n raging from 1 million to 2 million (increasing n by
10000 at each step). The result is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The sample complexity of private closeness testing.
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A General Techniques in Differential Privacy
A standard mechanism in the privacy literature, the Laplace mechanism, perturbs the output of an
algorithm by adding Laplace noise to make the output private. Assume the algorithm computes a
function f : [n]s → R. The amount of noise required depends on the privacy parameter, ξ, and how
much f varies over two neighboring datasets. More precisely, this variation of f is called sensitivity
of the function and it is defined as:
∆f = max
neighboring x,y
|f(x)− f(y)| .
The noise is drawn from a Laplace distribution with parameter b = ∆f/ξ. We denote the noise by
Lap(b). More precisely,
Pr[Lap(b) = x] =
1
2b
exp
(
−|x|
b
)
.
The following is well-known:
Lemma A.1 (The Laplace mechanism (Theorem 3.6 in [17])). Assume there is an algorithm A that
on input x, outputs f(x) + Lap(∆f/ξ). Then A is ξ-private.
Note that the expected value of Lap(b) is zero. Therefore, the expected value of the output remains
E[f(x)]. Since we draw the noise independently from x, the variance of the output is increased by
Var[Lap(b)] = 2b2.
Moreover, the following lemmas help us understand how the privacy guarantee changes if we process
the output of one or more private algorithm.
Lemma A.2 (Post-processing (Proposition 2.1 in [17])). Assume A is a ξ-private algorithm. Any
algorithm that on input x outputs a function f(A(x)) is also ξ-private.
Lemma A.3 (Composition Theorem (Theorem 3.16 in [17])). Let Ai : [n]s → R be a
ξi-private algorithm for i = 1, . . . , k. Any algorithm that on input x outputs a function
f (A1(x),A2(x), . . . ,Ak(x)) is
(∑k
i=1 ξi
)
-private.
B Generic Differentially Private Tester
In this section, we describe a simple generic method to convert a non-private tester into a private
tester with a multiplicative overhead in the sample complexity. While this method is known in the
differential privacy community, it is useful to contrast its sample complexity with the (substantially
smaller) sample complexity of our testers in Sections 3, 4, and 5.
Assume A is a tester that draws s(n, ) samples. The idea is to draw m · s(n, ) samples for a
sufficiently large m, and from this sample, to pick a random subset of size s(n, ) samples. Then, the
new tester runs A on the randomly chosen subset and outputs A’s output. Given two sample sets that
differ in one sample, the new private tester will give the same output whenever a chunk that does not
contain the differing sample is chosen, which happens with probability at most 1/m. This reduction
to a non-private tester is described in Algorithm 4. We formally show its correctness in Theorem B.1.
Algorithm 4 Reduction to a non-private tester
1: procedure GENERAL-PRIVATE-TESTER(, ξ)
2: m← d 6ξ e
3: s′ ← m · s(n, )
4: x1, x2, . . . , xs′ ← s′ samples from p.
5: r ← Pick a random number from [m].
6: O ← A ({x(r−1)s+1, x(r−1)s+2, . . . , xrs}).
7: With probability 1/6, O ← {accept, reject} \O. 〈〈flip the answer with probability 1/6.〉〉
8: Output O.
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Theorem B.1. Let A be an -tester for property P that uses s(n, ) samples from distribution p over
[n]. Algorithm 4 is an (, ξ)-private property tester for property P using O (s(n, )/ξ) samples.
Proof: Suppose A is an -tester for property P that uses s(n, ) samples. Without loss of generality,
assume the tester A errs with probability at most 1/64. Since the output of A is then flipped with
probability 1/6, by the union bound, the probability that Algorithm 4 errs is at most 1/3, and it is
thus an -tester for uniformity.
To prove the privacy guarantee, let m be d6/ξe, and let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xs′} and Y =
{y1, y2, . . . , ys′} be two sample sets of size s′ := m · s(n, ) that differ in exactly one sample.
Without loss of generality, we assume they differ in the first sample: xi = yi for i > 1 and x1 6= y1.
Algorithm 4 picks a random number, r, in [m] and feeds A with the r-th chunk of size s(n, ) from
the input sample set. If r 6= 1, the distribution of the output is identical X and Y . Let T (X) indicate
the output of Algorithm 4 on input X . More precisely, we have
Pr[T (X) = reject] =
m∑
i=1
Pr[T (X) = reject|r = i] ·Pr[r = i]
= 1m
m∑
i=1
Pr[T (X) = reject|r = i]
= 1m
m∑
i=2
Pr[T (Y ) = reject|r = i] + 1m Pr[T (X) = reject|r = 1]
≤ 1m
m∑
i=1
Pr[T (Y ) = reject|r = i] + 1m
≤ Pr[T (Y ) = reject] + 1m .
Since we change the output of A with probability 1/6, it is not hard to see that Pr[T (Y ) = reject] is
at least 1/6 for any input y. Thus,
Pr[T (X) = reject]
Pr[T (Y ) = reject]
≤ 1 + 6
m
≤ 1 + ξ < eξ .
Similarly, we can show the above inequality when the output is accept. Thus, the algorithm is
ξ-private. 
C Amplification of Confidence Parameter in the Private Setting
For convenience, throughout this paper we work with testing algorithms that have failure probability
at most 1/3. Here we point out that this is without loss of generality, since a standard amplification
method also succeeds in the differentially private setting.
Theorem C.1. Given A, an (, ξ)-private tester for property P , such that A uses s(n, , ξ) samples
for any input distribution p over [n]. Algorithm 5 is an (, ξ)-private tester for property P , using
O (log 1/δ · s(n, , ξ)) samples from p, that outputs the correct answer with probability 1− δ.
Proof: First, we show that algorithm 5 is ξ-private: Let X and Y be two sample sets of size m · s
(where m and s are as defined in algorithm 5) that differ only in one sample. Without loss of
generality, assume they differ in the first sample. Therefore, X(1) and Y (1) differ in only one sample,
and for i > 1, X(i) and Y (i) are identical. Hence, the distribution of the output of A in all of the
iterations except the first one is identical for both X and Y . For the first iteration, the distribution
over the output of A cannot change drastically, because A is a ξ-private algorithm. More formally,
we have the following:
Pr[A(X(i)) = accept] = Pr[A(Y (i)) = accept] for i > 1,
and
4This can be achieved by the standard amplification method (i.e., running the tester O(1) times and taking
the majority answer). The new sample complexity grows by at most a constant multiplicative factor.
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Algorithm 5 Amplified confidence parameter
1: procedure AMPLIFIER(n, , ξ)
2: m← 18dln 1δ e+ 1
3: s← s(n, , ξ)
4: c← 0
5: for i = 1, . . . ,m do
6: X(i) ← a set of s samples from p
7: Run A using samples in X(i).
8: if A accepts then
9: c← c+ 1
10: if c ≥ m/2 then
11: Output accept.
12: else
13: Output reject.
Pr[A(X(1)) = accept] ≤ eξ ·Pr[A(Y (1)) = accept].
An analogous argument holds when the output is reject. Let T (X) indicate the output of Algorithm
4 on input X . Let σ(X(i)) be an indicator variable that is one if A outputs accept on input X(i) and
zero otherwise. Since iterations of the algorithm are independent, we have:
Pr[T (X) = accept] = Pr
[
m∑
i=1
σ(X(i)) ≥ 9dln 1δ e+ 1
]
= Pr
[
σ(X(1)) = 1
] ·Pr [ m∑
i=2
σ(X(i)) = 9dln 1δ e
]
+Pr
[
m∑
i=2
σ(X(i)) ≥ 9dln 1δ e+ 1
]
≤ eξ ·Pr [σ(Y (1)) = 1] ·Pr [ m∑
i=2
σ(Y (i)) = 9dln 1δ e
]
+Pr
[
m∑
i=2
σ(Y (i)) ≥ 9dln 1δ e+ 1
]
≤ eξ ·Pr
[
m∑
i=1
σ(Y (i)) ≥ 9dln 1δ e+ 1
]
≤ eξ ·Pr[T (Y ) = accept] .
An analogous inequality holds for the case where the output is reject. Therefore, Algorithm 5 is
ξ-private. Moreover, the output of the algorithm is wrong only if the majority of the invocations of A
return the wrong answer (i.e. more than 9dln 1/δe times). However, A errs with probability at most
1/3 by definition. By the Hoeffding bound, the probability of outputting the wrong answer is
Pr [T (X) is wrong] ≤ e−2m/36 ≤ δ .
Thus, the total error probability is at most δ. Therefore, Algorithm 5 is an (, ξ)-private tester that
outputs the correct answer with probability 1− δ. 
D Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1. Given an (, ξ)-private uniformity tester using s(n, , ξ) samples, there exists an
(, ξ)-private tester for identity using s = s(6n, /3, ξ) samples.
Proof: Given s samples from p, we map them to s samples from p′ using the following mapping:
1. Given sample i from p, the process F1(i) flips a fair coin. If the coin is Heads, F1(i) outputs
i, otherwise, F1(i) outputs j drawn uniformly from [n]. Let p1 denote the output distribution
of F1(i)’s. It is clear that p1(i) = (1/2)p(i) + 1/(2n). We define q1(i) similarly.
2. Let mi = b3n(q(i) + 1/n)c. Given j and the output of process F1(i) where i is drawn from
p, process F2(i) outputs j with probability mi/ (3n(q(i) + 1/n)) and n+ 1 otherwise. Let
p2 denote the output distribution of the F2(i)’s. It is not hard to see that
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p2(j) = p1(j) · mj
3n(q(j) + 1/n)
=
1
2
·
(
p(j) +
1
n
)
· mj
3n(q(j) + 1/n)
for all i ∈ [n], and p2(n+ 1) = 1−
∑n
`=1 p2(`). We define q2(i) similarly.
3. Given k, the output of process F2(i) where i is drawn from p, we output F3(i) = (k, a)
such that a is uniformly chosen from [6nq2(k)]. Note that for k ∈ [n], 6nq2(k) is equal to
mk and it is an integer, so the set [6nq2(k)] is well-defined. We denote the distribution of
F3(k)’s as p′. It is not hard to see that if p = q, then
p′ ((k, a)) =
1
2
·
(
q(j) +
1
n
)
· mj
3n(q(j) + 1/n)
· 1
mj
=
1
(6n)
for j ∈ [n]. For k = n+ 1,
6n q2(n+ 1) = 6n− 6n
n∑
`=1
m`
6n
= 6n−
n∑
`=1
m`.
is also an integer. Therefore, p′((n+ 1, a)) is also q2(n+ 1)/(6n q2(n+ 1)) = 1/6n.
Thus, if p = q, then p′ will be a uniform distribution. Similarly, if ‖p−q‖1 ≥  then ‖p′−U‖1 ≥ /3.
For a detailed proof, see [19].
Then, we run the private uniformity tester using the samples from p′, and output the answer of the
tester. As shown in [19], if p is -far from q, then p′ is /3-far from uniform; and if p is identical to
q, then p′ is uniform. Therefore, the algorithm is an -tester for identity. It suffices to show that the
algorithm preserves differential privacy.
Assume X is the set of samples drawn from p, and denote by pi the bits of randomness that the
mapping used to build X ′pi , the set of samples from p
′. Assume Y is a sample set from p that differs
from X in exactly one location. Then X ′pi also differs from X
′
pi in at most one location, because
each sample from p is used in generating exactly one sample from p′. Let A be the (, ξ)-private
uniformity tester and denote by A(X ′pi) the output of the tester on input X ′pi. Since the algorithm is
ξ-private, we have:
Pr[A(S′pi) = accept] ≤ eξ ·Pr[A(Y ) = accept] .
Let T (X) denote the output of our algorithm. By construction, we have
Pr[T (X) = accept]
Pr[T (Y ) = accept]
=
∑
pi Pr[A(X ′pi) = accept] ·Pr[pi]∑
pi Pr[A(Y ′pi) = accept] ·Pr[pi]
≤
∑
pi e
ξ ·Pr[A(Y ′pi) = accept] ·Pr[pi]∑
pi Pr[A(Y ′pi) = accept] ·Pr[pi]
≤ eξ .
By the same argument, we can show the above inequality holds when the output is reject. Therefore,
our algorithm is an (, ξ)-private tester. 
E Proof of Theorem 4.1
Theorem 4.1. Given s = O(
√
n/(
√
ξ) +
√
n/2) samples from distribution p over [n], Algorithm
1 is an (, ξ)-private tester for uniformity if s is sufficiently smaller than n.
Proof: Algorithm 1 draws s samples from the underlying distribution P . We use the Laplace
mechanism to make the algorithm private: Let K be the number of unique elements in the sample set.
Since changing one sample in the sample set can change the number of unique elements by no more
than two, adding Laplace noise with parameter 2/ξ to K makes it ξ-private. Using the composition
theorem A.3, the algorithm is ξ-private.
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To show the algorithm is an -tester, we prove the statistic K ′ concentrates well around its expected
value in both the soundness and completeness cases. Using Lemmas 1 and 2 in [24], we have the
following inequalities for the number of unique elements:
EU [K]−EP [K] ≥ s
2‖p− Un‖21
n
(3)
and
Var[K] ≤ EU [K]− EP [K] + s
2
n
. (4)
First, we show the algorithm is an -tester for uniformity. Then, we prove that it is ξ-private.
Assume that the underlying distribution is the uniform distribution. Note that E[K] = E[K ′]. Then,
by the Chebyshev inequality and Equation 4 we have that:
Pr[|K ′ −EU [K]| ≥ C
2
22
] = Pr[|K ′ −EU [K ′]| ≥ C
2
22
]
≤ 4
4
C4
Var[K ′]
≤ 4
4
C4
(Var[K] +Var[Lap(2/ξ)])
≤ 4
4
C4
(
s2
n
+
8
ξ2
)
≤ 4
C2
+
324
C4ξ2
≤ 13 ,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that C ≥ max(3.73 /√ξ, 4.9). Thus, the probability
of rejecting P is less than 1/3.
Now suppose P is a distribution which is -far from uniform. Again by the Chebyshev inequality and
Equation (4) we have that:
Pr[|K ′ −EP [K]| ≥ (EU [K]−EP [K])/2] = Pr[|K ′ −EP [K ′]| ≥ (EU [K]−EP [K])/2]
≤ 4Var[K
′]
(EU [K]−EP [K])2
=
4(Var[K] +Var[Lap(2/ξ)])
(EU [K]−EP [K])2
=
4(Var[K] + 8ξ−2)
(EU [K]−EP [K])2
≤ 4(EU [K]−EP [K] + s
2/n+ 8ξ−2)
(EU [K]−EP [K])2
≤ 4
EU [K]−EP [K] +
4s2/n+ 32/ξ2
(EU [K]−EP [K])2 .
On the other hand by Equation 3, EU [K]−EP [K] is at least C2/2. Thus,
Pr[|K ′ −EP [K]| ≥ (EU [K]−EP [K])/2] ≤ 4
2
C2
+
4s24
C4n
+
324
C4ξ2
≤ 13 ,
where the last inequality is true when C ≥ max (6, 6, 4.12/√ξ). Thus, the probability of accepting
is less than 1/3. 
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F Proof of Theorem 4.2
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm 2 is an (, ξ)-private tester for uniformity.
Proof: Let X = {x1, . . . , xs} be a set of s samples from p. Let f(X) be the number of collisions in
X . All variables are as defined in Algorithm 2. First, we show that fˆ(X) and nmax(X) concentrate
well around their expected values.
Lemma F.1. If s is Θ
(√
n
2 +
√
n logn
 ξ1/2
+
√
nmax(1,log 1/ξ)
 ξ +
1
2 ξ
)
, the following holds with proba-
bility at least 11/12:
• If p is the uniform distribution, then fˆ(X) is less than 1+2/6n
(
s
2
)
.
• If p is -far from uniform, then fˆ(X) is greater than 1+2/6n
(
s
2
)
.
Proof: First, we compute the expected value of fˆ(X). Since the expected value of the noise is zero,
E[fˆ(X)] is equal to E[f(X)]. So, if p is uniform, then E[fˆ(X)] is
(
s
2
)
/n, and if p is -far from
uniform E[fˆ(X)] is at least (1 + 2)
(
s
2
)
/n. Let α satisfy ‖p‖22 = (1 + α)/n and σ be the standard
deviation of fˆ(X). We make an assumption that |2/6− α|(s2)/n is at least √12σ. Below, this
assumption concludes the statement of the lemma. Later, we prove that the assumption holds for
sufficiently large s.
The conditions of the lemma hold if fˆ(X) is closer to its expected value than the distance of the
threshold, 1+
2/6
n
(
s
2
)
, to its expected value. Using the Chebyshev inequality, the probability that the
conditions do not hold is at most
Pr
[∣∣∣fˆ(X)−E[f(X)]∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ 1+2/6n (s2)−E[f(X)]∣∣∣] = Pr [∣∣∣fˆ(X)−E[f(X)]∣∣∣ > |2/6−α|n (s2)]]
≤ Pr
[
|fˆ(X)−E[f(x)]| ≥ √12σ
]
≤ 112 .
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
|2/6− α|
n
(
s
2
)
≥
√
12σ. (5)
Recall that σ2 is equal to Var[f(X)] + Var[Lap(2ηf/ξ)], so σ is at most√
2 max(Var[f(x)], 8η2f/ξ
2). Hence, we prove two stronger inequalities that yield to Equation (5):
s ≥
√
20n
√
Var[f(X)]
|2/6− α| , (6)
and
s ≥
√
28n ηf
ξ|2/6− α| . (7)
Using a similar proof to the proof of Lemma 4 in [11], the inequality of Equation (6) holds for
s = c
√
n/2 for sufficiently large constant c. Now, we focus on Equation (7). If p is a uniform
distribution, α is zero, and if p is -far form being uniform, then α is at least 2. Therefore, the
denominator is at least 2/6. Solving Equation (7) for s, we have:
s ≥ c′ ·
(
1
2 ξ
+
√
n log n
 ξ1/2
+
√
nmax(1, log 1/ξ)
 ξ
)
.
Hence, for sufficiently large constant c′, Equation (5) holds and the proof is complete. 
We have the following lemma:
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Lemma F.2. Let X be a sample set of size s from the uniform distribution over [n]. With probability
11/12, we have
nˆmax ≤ max
(
3
2
· s
n
, 12 e2 ln 24n
)
+
2 ln 12
ξ
.
Proof: First, we show that nmax(X) is at most max
(
3s/(2n), 12 e2 ln 24n
)
with probability at least
23/24. It suffices to show that all of the ni(X)’s are smaller than this bound. Consider the following
cases: First, assume s is at most 12n · ln(24n). Let k := 12 e2 · ln(24n) ≥ e2s/n. If s ≤ k, then
nmax(X) is at most max
(
3s/(2n), 12e2 ln 24n
)
. Otherwise,
Pr [ni(X) > k] ≤
(
s
k
)
· 1
nk
≤
(s · e
k
)k
· 1
nk
≤ e−k ≤ 1
24n
.
Second, assume s is greater than 12n · ln(24n). By the Chernoff bound, we have
Pr
[
ni(X) >
s
n
(
1 +
1
2
)]
≤ exp(− s
12n
) ≤ 1
24n
.
Thus,
Pr
[
ni(X) > max
(
3s/(2n), 12 e2 ln 24n
)] ≤ 1
24n
.
Using the union bound, with probability 23/24 all the ni(X)’s, and consequently nmax(X), are
smaller than max
(
3s/(2n), 12 e2 ln 24n
)
.
Moreover, based on the properties of the Laplace distribution, we have
Pr
[
Lap(2/ξ) ≥ 2 ln 12
ξ
]
≤ exp(− ln 12)
2
≤ 1
24
.
By the union bound, nmax(X) and Lap(2/ξ) are not exceeding the aforementioned bounds with
probability 11/12. Therefore, we have
Pr
[
nˆmax < max
(
3s/(2n), 12 e2 ln 24n
)
+
2 ln 12
ξ
]
≥ 11
12
.
Thus, the proof is complete. 
Given X , we define two probabilistic events, E1(X) and E2(X), to be
E1(X) : nˆmax < T E2(X) : fˆ(X) <
6 + 2
6n
(
s
2
)
,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the noise. Observe that E1(X) and E2(X) are
independent. We use E1(X) and E2(X) to indicate the complementary events. LetM(X) denote
the output of the algorithm when the input sample set is X . We set the output, O, to accept, if
both E1(X) and E2(X) are true, and at the end of the algorithm we may flip the output with small
probability. Here, we prove the probability of outputting the correct answer is at least 2/3. Consider
two following cases:
(i) p is uniform: Using Lemma F.2, with probability at least 11/12 we have that nˆmax is less than T .
By lemma F.1, fˆ is less than
(
s
2
)|1 + 2/6|/n with probability at least 11/12. Therefore, Pr[E1(X)]
and Pr[E2(X)] are at most 1/12. At the end of the algorithm, we flip the output with probability at
most 1/6. Using the union bound, we have
Pr [M(X) = accept] ≥ 1−Pr [E1(X)]−Pr [E2(X)]− 1
6
≥ 2
3
.
(ii) p is -far from uniform: By lemma F.1, fˆ(X) is greater than
(
s
2
)|1 + 2/6|/n with probability
at least 11/12, so Pr[E2(X)] is at most 1/12. We flip the output of the algorithm with probability at
most 1/6. As a result, we have
Pr [M(X) = reject] ≥ 1−Pr [E2(X)]− 1
6
≥ 2
3
.
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Thus, with probability at least 2/3 we output the correct answer.
In the rest of the proof, we focus on proving the privacy guarantee. It is not hard to see that
|nmax(X)− nmax(Y )| is at most one. By the properties of the Laplace mechanism in Lemma A.1,
nˆmax(X) is ξ/2-private. Assume |f(X)− f(Y )| is at most ηf . Then, fˆ(X) is ξ/2-private as well.
Since privacy preserved after post-processing (Lemma A.2), both E1(X) and E2(X) are ξ/2-private.
Using the composition lemma A.3, the output is ξ-private (by Lemma A.3).
Now, assume |f(X) − f(Y )| is greater than ηf . In this case, we show that nmax(X) has to be
large. Therefore, the output is reject with high probability regardless of fˆ(X). Although fˆ(X) is not
private, it cannot affect the output drastically and the output remains private. We prove this formally
below. Without loss of generality, assume we replace a sample i in X with j to get Y . Thus, we have
|f(X)− f(Y )| =
∣∣∣(ni(X)2 )+ (nj(X)2 )− (ni(Y )2 )− (nj(Y )2 )∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(ni(X)2 )+ (nj(X)2 )− (ni(X)−12 )− (nj(X)+12 )∣∣∣
= |ni(X)− 1− nj(X)|
≤ nmax(X) ,
where the inequality comes from the assumption that there is at least one copy of i in X . Therefore,
nmax(X) is greater than ηf as well. Since T is even smaller than ηf , it is very unlikely that nˆmax be
smaller than the threshold T . More formally, by the properties of the Laplace distribution, we have:
Pr[E1(X)] = Pr[nˆmax(X) ≤ T ] ≤ Pr[nˆmax(X)− nmax(X) ≤ T − ηf ]
≤ Pr
[
Lap(2/ξ) ≤ − 2max(ln 3,ln 3/ξ)ξ
]
≤ exp (−max(ln 3, ln 3/ξ))/2 ≤ min(1/6, ξ/6) .
(8)
Now, consider the case that the algorithm output accept on input X . It is not hard to see that
Pr [M(X) = accept] = (5/6) ·Pr[E1(X) ∧ E2(X)] + (1/6) · (1−Pr[E1(X) ∧ E2(X)])
= (2/3) ·Pr[E1(X) ∧ E2(X)] + 1/6
= (2/3) ·Pr[E1(X)] ·Pr[E2(X)] + 1/6 .
(9)
Observe that since we flip the answer with probability 1/6 at the end, Pr[M(X) = accept] and
Pr[M(Y ) = accept] are at least 1/6. By this fact, Equation (8), and Equation (9), we have:
Pr[M(X) = accept]
Pr[M(Y ) = accept] ≤
Pr[E1(X)] + 1/6
1/6
≤ ξ + 1 < eξ .
Now, consider the case where the output of the algorithm is reject on the inputX . Similar to Equation
(8), we can prove Pr[E1(Y )] is at most min(1/6, ξ/6). Similar to Equation (9), it is not hard to see
that
Pr [M(X) = reject] = (2/3) · (Pr[E1(X) ∨ E2(X)]) + 1/6 . (10)
If Pr[M(X) = reject] is at most Pr[M(Y ) = reject], then clearly, we have:
Pr[M(X) = reject]
Pr[M(Y ) = reject] ≤ 1 < e
ξ .
Thus, assume Pr[M(X) = reject] is less than Pr[M(Y ) = reject]. Then, we have:
Pr[M(X) = reject]
Pr[M(Y ) = reject] =
(2/3) · (Pr[E1(X) ∨ E2(X)]) + 1/6
(2/3) · (Pr[E1(Y ) ∨ E2(Y )]) + 1/6
≤ Pr[E1(X) ∨ E2(X)]
Pr[E1(Y ) ∨ E2(Y )]
≤ 1
1−Pr[E1(Y )]
≤ 1
1−min(1/6, ξ/6) < 1 + ξ < e
ξ .
The second to last inequality is true since we showed previously that Pr[E1(Y )] is at most
min(1/6, ξ/6). Hence, the proof is complete. 
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G Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem 5.1. Given sample access to two distributions p and q, Algorithm 3 is an (, ξ)-private
tester for closeness of p and q.
Proof: Our proof has two main parts. First, we show that the algorithm outputs the correct answer
with probability 2/3. Second, we show that the algorithm is private.
Proof of Correctness: First, assume p and q are equal. In the algorithm, we compute Z and add
Laplace noise, η, to it. Then we compare it to threshold T := 2m2/(8n+ 4m). Based on Equation
(1), we have
E[Z ′] = E[Z] +E[η] = E[Z].
Using the Chebyshev inequality and Equation (2),
Pr[outputting reject] = Pr[Z ′ > T ] ≤ Var[Z
′]
T 2
≤ Var[Z] +Var[η]
T 2
≤ 2 min{m,n}+ 128/ξ
2
T 2
≤ 1
3
,
where the last inequality is true for a sufficiently large universal constant C.
Case 1: Consider the case m ≤ n. Then,
2 min{m,n}
T 2
=
2m (8n+ 4m)2
m44
≤ 2m (12n)
2
m44
≤ 288
(
n2/3
4/3
· 1
m
)3
≤ 288
C3
≤ 1
6
,
where the last inequality is true for C greater than 12. Moreover,
128 ξ−2
T 2
≤ 128 (8n+ 4m)
2
ξ2m4 4
≤ 128 (12n)
2
ξ2m4 4
≤ 18432
( √
n√
ξ
· 1
m
)4
≤ 18432
C4
≤ 1
6
,
where the last inequality is true for C greater than 19. Thus, for sufficiently large C, the probability
of rejecting two identical distribution p and q is less than 1/3.
Case 2: Consider the case n < m. Then,
2 min{m,n}
T 2
=
2n (8n+ 4m)2
m44
≤ 2n (12m)
2
m44
≤ 288
(√
n
2
· 1
m
)2
≤ 288
C2
≤ 1
6
,
where the last inequality is true for C greater than 42. Moreover,
128 ξ−2
T 2
≤ 128 (8n+ 4m)
2
ξ2m4 2
≤ 128 (12m)
2
ξ2m4 2
≤ 18432
(
1
ξ 
· 1
m
)2
≤ 18432
C2
≤ 1
6
,
where the last inequality is true for C greater than 136. Thus, for sufficiently large C the probability
of rejecting two identical distribution p and q is less than 1/3.
Now, suppose p and q are at least -far from each other in `1-distance. We show that in
this case Z ′ is greater than T with high probability using Chebyshev’s inequality. Based on
Equation (2), we bound the variance of Z ′ in terms of the expected value of Z ′. First, observe
that, by Equation (1), we have that E[Z ′] is at least C/6 for any setting of parameters. Thus, for
sufficiently large C, we can assume E[Z ′] is at least 360. Let I1 be the set of all indices i such that
(1− (1− e−m(pi+qi))/(m(pi + qi))) is greater 1/2, and let I2 be the set of remaining indices, i.e.,
I2 = [n] \ I1. By Equation (1), we have
E[Z ′]2 =
(∑
i
(pi − qi)2
pi + qi
m
(
1− 1− e
−m(pi+qi)
m(pi + qi)
))2
≥ 360
∑
i
(pi − qi)2
pi + qi
m
(
1− 1− e
−m(pi+qi)
m(pi + qi)
)
≥ 360
∑
i∈I1
(p(i)− q(i))2
p(i) + q(i)
m
(
1− 1− e
−m(p(i)+q(i))
m(p(i) + q(i))
)
≥ 36
∑
i∈I1
5m
(p(i)− q(i))2
p(i) + q(i)
.
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On the other hand, for any i in I2, we can conclude that m(p(i) + q(i)) is less than 2. Therefore,
m (p(i)−q(i))
2
p(i)+q(i) is at most 2. Thus,
∑
i∈I2
5m (p(i)−q(i))
2
p(i)+q(i) is at most 10n. Since
(p(i)−q(i))2
p(i)+q(i) is less than
p(i) + q(i),
∑
i∈I2
5m (p(i)−q(i))
2
p(i)+q(i) is also less than 10m. Hence, we have
Var[Z] ≤ 2 min{m,n}+
∑
i
5m
(p(i)− q(i))2
p(i) + q(i)
≤ 2 min{m,n}+
∑
i∈I1
5m
(p(i)− q(i))2
p(i) + q(i)
+
∑
i∈I2
5m
(p(i)− q(i))2
p(i) + q(i)
≤ 12 min{m,n}+ E[Z
′]2
36
.
By Equation (1), the expected value of Z ′ is at least 2T . Using Chebyshev’s inequality, we obtain
Pr[outputting “Accept”] = Pr[Z ′ ≤ T ] ≤ Pr[E[Z ′]− Z ′ ≥ E[Z ′]− T ] ≤ Pr
[
E[Z ′]− Z ′ ≥ E[Z
′]
2
]
≤ 4Var[Z
′]
E[Z ′]2
≤ 4(Var[Z] +Var[η])
E[Z ′]2
≤ 48 min{m,n}
E[Z ′]2
+
10
A +
512
E[Z ′]2 ξ2
≤ 48 min{m,n}(4n+ 2m)
2
m44
+
1
9
+
512(4n+ 2m)2
m4 4 ξ2
≤ 1
3
,
where the last inequality is true for sufficiently large C.
Proof of Privacy Guarantee: First, observe that the value of Z does not change drastically over two
neighboring datasets. More formally, we have the following simple lemma:
Lemma G.1. The sensitivity of the statistic Z is at most 8.
Proof: Assume two neighboring dataset x and y. Let Z(x) and Z(y) be the statistic for x and y
respectively. We define Zi as follows:
Zi :=

|Xi + Yi| −Xi − Yi
Xi + Yi
if Xi + Yi 6= 0
0 otherwise.
We use a superscript (x) or (y) for Xi, Yi, Zi to indicate the corresponding dataset we calculate them
from. Since x and y are two neighboring datasets, there is a sample i in the x which has been replaced
by j. Without loss of generality, assume i was a sample from p. This implies that X(x)i −X(y)i = 1
and Y (x)i = Y
(y)
i .
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If X(y)i + Y
(y)
i is zero, then Z
(x)
i is one. Thus, the difference of Z
(x)
i and Z
(y)
i is one. Now, assume
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i is at least one. Then, we have
∣∣∣Z(x)i − Z(y)i ∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
X
(x)
i − Y (x)i
)2
X
(x)
i + Y
(x)
i
−
(
X
(y)
i − Y (y)i
)2
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
X
(y)
i − Y (y)i + 1
)2
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i + 1
−
(
X
(y)
i − Y (y)i
)2
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
X
(y)
i − Y (y)i
)2
+ 2
(
X
(y)
i − Y (y)i
)
+ 1
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i + 1
−
(
X
(y)
i − Y (y)i
)2
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(
X
(y)
i − Y (y)i
)
+ 1
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i + 1
− (X
(y)
i − Y (y)i )2(
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i + 1
)
·
(
X
(y)
i + Y
(y)
i
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 + 1 + 1 ≤ 4 .
Similarly, we can show |Z(x)j − Z(y)j | is at most four. Hence, we can conclude that |Z(x) − Z(y)| is
at most eight. 
Therefore, using the property of the Laplace mechanism (Lemma A.1), Z ′ is ξ-private. Using Lemma
A.2 and the fact that the output of the algorithm is a function of Z ′, we conclude the algorithm is
ξ-private. 
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